Moral choice when harming is unavoidable by Berman, J Z & Kupor, D
LBS Research Online
J Z Berman and D Kupor
Moral choice when harming is unavoidable
Article
This version is available in the LBS Research Online repository: http://lbsresearch.london.edu/
id/eprint/1407/
Supporting Materials
Berman, J Z and Kupor, D
(2020)
Moral choice when harming is unavoidable.
Psychological Science, 31 (10). pp. 1294-1301. ISSN 0956-7976
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797620948821
Reuse of this item is allowed under the Creative Commons licence:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
SAGE Publications (UK and US)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0956...
Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LBS Research Online for purposes of
research and/or private study. Further distribution of the material, or use for any commercial gain, is
not permitted.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797620948821
Psychological Science
 1 –8
© The Author(s) 2020
Article reuse guidelines: 
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10 1177/09567 7620948821
www.psychologicalscience.org/PS
ASSOCIATION FOR
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCEResearch Article
To what extent are individuals harm averse? Existing 
research suggests that harm aversion is a principle force 
guiding moral judgment and choice. Individuals are reluc-
tant to harm others even when doing so would maximize 
social welfare (Petrinovich, O’Neill, & Jorgensen, 1993) 
and even prefer to harm themselves rather than harm 
others (Crockett, Kurth-Nelson, Siegel, Dayan, & Dolan, 
2014).
We argue that harm aversion is more limited in scope 
than previously documented. Consistent with prior litera-
ture, our hypothesis was that individuals strongly prefer 
to avoid committing a harmful act if they are able to do 
so (Miller, Hannikainen, & Cushman, 2014; Petrinovich 
et al., 1993; Spranca, Minsk, & Baron, 1991). However, 
harming is not always avoidable, and decision-makers 
must often choose between committing small amounts 
of harm to obtain few social benefits and committing 
larger amounts of harm to obtain greater social benefits. 
We argue that in these situations, individuals become 
less likely to prefer that harm be minimized and more 
likely to prefer that social benefits be maximized. Thus, 
although individuals are reluctant to trade off no harm 
for some harm to achieve benefits, they are much more 
willing to trade off some harm for more harm in return 
for the same degree of—or even fewer—marginal 
benefits.
Choices that necessitate the commission of at least 
some harm pervade decision-making. Most everyday 
consumption decisions require people to choose 
among alternatives that harm the environment to vary-
ing degrees (Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). For example, 
when deciding where to live or how to furnish one’s 
home, individuals often must choose among options 
that each carry positive carbon footprints. Similarly, 
policymakers often must choose among options that 
each furnish a mixture of societal harms and benefits 
of varying magnitudes. Yet we know little about how 
individuals balance the costs and benefits of their 
actions when all the options in a choice set require an 
948821 PSSXXX10.1177/0956797620948821Berman, KuporMoral Choice When Harming Is Unavoidable
research-article2020
Corresponding Author:
Jonathan Z. Berman, London Business School, Sussex Place, Regent’s 
Park, London NW1 4SA, United Kingdom 
E-mail: jberman@london.edu
Moral Choice When Harming Is  
Unavoidable
Jonathan Z. Berman1  and Daniella Kupor2
1Department of Marketing, London Business School, and 2Department of Marketing, Boston University
Abstract
Past research suggests that actors often seek to minimize harm at the cost of maximizing social welfare. However, this 
prior research has confounded a desire to minimize the negative impact caused by one’s actions (harm aversion) with 
a desire to avoid causing any harm whatsoever (harm avoidance). Across six studies (N = 2,152), we demonstrate that 
these two motives are distinct. When decision-makers can completely avoid committing a harmful act, they strongly 
prefer to do so. However, harming cannot always be avoided. Often, decision-makers must choose between committing 
less harm for less benefit and committing more harm for more benefit. In these cases, harm aversion diminishes 
substantially, and decision-makers become increasingly willing to commit greater harm to obtain greater benefits. 
Thus, value trade-offs that decision-makers refuse to accept when it is possible to completely avoid committing harm 
can suddenly become desirable when some harm must be committed.
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actor to commit some harm (cf. Bonnefon, Shariff, & 
Rahwan, 2016).
Distinguishing Between Dilemmas 
Containing Avoidable and Unavoidable 
Harmful Acts
We distinguish between dilemmas in which decision-
makers can avoid committing a harmful act and dilem-
mas in which committing a harmful act is unavoidable. 
In the former type of dilemma, individuals can select 
an option that does not require the commission of harm. 
Consider a government agent faced with two proposals 
for feeding the hungry: Proposal A would create enough 
farmland to feed 100 families without harming the rain 
forest, whereas proposal B would create enough farm-
land to feed 500 families but would require razing one 
acre of the rain forest. If the agent chooses proposal A, 
he or she would avoid committing a harmful act 
(destroying the rain forest) but would also fail to maxi-
mize benefits (feeding as many people as possible).
In the latter type of dilemma, decision-makers must 
instead choose between options that would each 
require a harmful act to be committed. Imagine now 
that the two proposals would feed the same number of 
families, but proposal A would require razing one acre 
of the rain forest, whereas proposal B would require 
razing two acres. Across both dilemmas, the marginal 
increase in harms and benefits is matched: Destroying 
one additional acre of the rain forest would provide 
food for an additional 400 families. If an agent refuses 
to destroy one additional acre in the former case, the 
agent ought to be similarly unwilling to do so in the 
latter case. However, when we randomly assigned each 
of 380 online participants to one of these two scenarios, 
46.1% chose to destroy one additional rain-forest acre 
in the former case, when it was possible to completely 
avoid committing a harmful act, whereas 78.4% chose 
to do so in the latter case, when completely avoiding com-
mitting harm was no longer possible, χ2(1, N = 380) = 
41.53, p < .001, ϕ = .33 (this study was preregistered at 
https://aspredicted.org/4gf64.pdf). This suggests that 
value trade-offs that individuals refuse to accept when 
it is possible to completely avoid committing harm can 
suddenly become desirable when some harm must be 
committed.
Why might harm aversion diminish when individuals 
can no longer completely avoid committing a harmful 
act? Descriptive theories of morality suggest that judg-
ments often reflect an adherence to intuitively appeal-
ing deontological principles such as “destroying the 
rain forest is wrong, regardless of the consequences” 
(e.g., Everett, Pizarro, & Crockett, 2016). We argue that 
the intuitive appeal of many deontological principles 
breaks down when decision-makers cannot altogether 
avoid committing harm. In these situations, individuals 
can no longer completely avoid violating a principle 
because the principle will be violated regardless of what 
is chosen. Decision-makers may thus become concerned 
with making sure that the violation is not done in vain. 
Instead they may prefer that more harm be conducted to 
ensure that the violation of a principle is “worth it,” simi-
lar to how people are willing to spend additional 
resources to justify sunk costs (Arkes & Blumer, 1985) or 
recuperate losses (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991).
Overview
In the following studies, we examined how individuals 
make value trade-offs across dilemmas containing 
avoidable and unavoidable harmful acts. We predicted 
that the preference to minimize harm would decrease 
when decision-makers were no longer able to com-
pletely avoid committing a harmful act and instead had 
to choose between options that each require commit-
ting some harm.
In all studies, sample sizes were determined in 
advance. All conditions and measures assessed are 
reported in this article with the exception of attention-
check questions, which can be found in the supporting 
materials at https://osf.io/4vd53/, alongside full study 
materials. In all studies, we recruited a minimum of 100 
participants per cell. Data files for all studies can be 
accessed on OSF at https://osf.io/84yhe/.
Study 1: Pulling Life Support From the 
Terminally Ill
Study 1 presents further evidence that people are resistant 
to exchanging harm for benefits when they can com-
pletely avoid committing a harmful act but are more likely 
to do so when committing some harm is unavoidable.
Method
We recruited 405 participants from Amazon Mechanical 
Turk (MTurk) to participate in this study. We removed 
34 participants who failed an attention check, resulting 
in a final sample of 371 participants (mean age = 37.3 
years; 55% female, 45% male).
Each participant was randomly assigned to either an 
avoidable-harm condition or an unavoidable-harm con-
dition. All participants assumed the role of a doctor 
who faced a decision regarding whether to pull life 
support from a dying patient to save money that would 
be used for cancer research. In the avoidable-harm 
condition, participants could choose to pull life support 
from one dying child to save $60,000 for cancer research 
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or choose not to do so. In the unavoidable-harm condi-
tion, participants instead faced a decision about whether 
to pull life support from one dying child to save $800 
for cancer research or to pull life support from two 
dying children to save $50,000 for cancer research. 
Despite the fact that the termination of one additional 
life would yield greater benefits in the avoidable-harm 
condition (a net savings of $60,000) than in the unavoid-
able-harm condition (a net savings of $49,200), we pre-
dicted that participants in the avoidable-harm condition 
would be less likely to accept such a trade-off than 
those in the unavoidable-harm condition.
Results
Consistent with our hypothesis, results showed that 
participants were more likely to prefer to commit 
greater harm in exchange for greater benefits in the 
unavoidable-harm condition (69.9%) than in the avoid-
able-harm condition (28.6%), χ2(1, N = 371) = 65.10, 
p < .001, ϕ = .41.1
Study 2: Donating to the Opposition
In Study 2, we examined whether our previous results would 
hold in an incentive-compatible context—allocating 
money to support political nonprofits. We predicted 
that when participants could avoid allocating any 
money to support an oppositional political party, they 
would do so, even if doing so failed to maximize net 
benefits to support their own party. However, we pre-
dicted that when participants could no longer com-
pletely avoid allocating at least some money to the 
opposition, they would become more likely to maxi-
mize net benefits to their own party.
Method
We preregistered the design, sample size, and analysis 
plan for this study on AsPredicted (https://aspredicted 
.org/8a6ta.pdf). We aimed to recruit 400 participants 
from MTurk and collected a total of 403 participants. 
Following our preregistration plan, we removed 72 par-
ticipants who failed an attention check, resulting in a 
final sample of 331 participants (mean age = 38 years; 
47.4% male, 52.0% female, 0.6% nonbinary).
Following our preregistration plan, we restricted par-
ticipation to individuals who were registered with either 
the Democratic (57.1%) or Republican (42.9%) party. 
Participants were faced with a choice regarding the 
allocation of real money to two nonprofits. One of these 
nonprofits (Priorities USA) was dedicated to propelling 
the Democratic presidential nominee to victory, whereas 
the other nonprofit (WinRed) was dedicated 
to propelling the Republican presidential nominee to 
victory. We operationalized benefits as a donation to a 
nonprofit in support of participants’ registered political 
party and operationalized harm as a donation in sup-
port of the opposing party. A pretest confirmed that 
participants perceived these two types of donations as 
yielding benefits and harms, respectively (for details, 
see the Results section).
We randomly assigned each participant to either an 
avoidable-harm condition or an unavoidable-harm con-
dition. In the avoidable-harm condition, participants 
could choose to donate $2 to the nonprofit supporting 
their own political party and $0 to the nonprofit sup-
porting the political opposition (a harm-minimization 
option), or they could choose to donate $4 to a non-
profit supporting their own political party and $1 to a 
nonprofit supporting the political opposition (a benefit-
maximization option). For example, participants who 
indicated that they were registered Democrats could 
choose to donate either (a) $2 to Priorities USA and $0 
to WinRed or (b) $4 to Priorities USA and $1 to WinRed.
In the unavoidable-harm condition, the options were 
the same except that we added an additional $2 dona-
tion to the political-opposition nonprofit; as a result, 
participants could no longer avoid committing a harm-
ful act (i.e., donating to the opposing party). Thus, the 
harm-minimization option would result in a $2 donation 
in support of the participant’s own party and a $2 dona-
tion in support of the political opposition, whereas the 
benefit-maximization option would result in a $4 dona-
tion in support of the participant’s own party and a $3 
donation in support of the political opposition. For 
example, participants who indicated that they were 
registered Democrats could choose to donate either (a) 
$2 to Priorities USA and $2 to WinRed or (b) $4 to 
Priorities USA and $3 to WinRed.
In sum, across both conditions, choosing to minimize 
harm meant that participants were unwilling to donate 
an additional $1 to the political opposition in order for 
their own party to receive an additional $2, whereas 
choosing to maximize net benefits meant that they were 
willing to make this trade-off.
Finally, before making their selection, all participants 
learned that in addition to their participation payment, 
they would be entered into a raffle. If they won the 
raffle, a donation would be made on their behalf in 
accordance with their selection in the survey.
Results
Pretest. We conducted a pretest among 78 participants 
drawn from MTurk to assess whether participants perceived 
the donation of funds to support their own political party 
as a social benefit and the donation of funds to support 
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the opposing party as a social harm. Participants rated 
the extent to which a donation made to each nonprofit 
was either beneficial or harmful to the country on a 
7-point bipolar scale (−3 = extremely harmful, 0 = neither 
beneficial nor harmful, 3 = extremely beneficial). Partici-
pants judged a donation made to the nonprofit aligned 
with their own party to be more beneficial than harmful 
(M = 1.24, SD = 1.38), t(77) = 7.97, p < .001, d = 0.90, 95% 
confidence interval (CI) = [0.60, 1.20], whereas they 
judged a donation made to the nonprofit aligned with the 
opposing party to be more harmful than beneficial (M = 
−0.82, SD = 1.81), t(77) = −3.99, p < .001, d = 0.45, 95% 
CI = [0.21, 0.70].
Main study. Consistent with our preregistered hypoth-
esis, results showed that participants were more likely to 
trade off greater harm for greater benefits in the unavoid-
able-harm condition (67.5%) than in the avoidable-harm 
condition (35.1%), χ2(1, N = 331) = 34.68, p < .001, ϕ = 
.32. In other words, when it was possible to completely 
avoid committing a harmful act (donating to support the 
opposition), participants strongly preferred to do so even 
though it deprived their own political party of even more 
money. However, when it was not possible to completely 
avoid doing so, participants preferred to maximize net 
benefits to their own party rather than minimize contri-
butions to the opposition.
Discussion
Study 2 found that participants favored minimizing 
harm when committing a harmful act was avoidable, 
whereas they favored maximizing benefits when com-
mitting at least some harm was unavoidable.
Study 3: Divergent Goals Activated by 
Avoidable and Unavoidable Harmful Acts
Study 3 assessed people’s reasoning for their choices. 
We predicted that individuals rely more heavily on a 
harm-minimization goal when they can completely 
avoid committing a harmful act but rely more heavily 
on a benefit-maximization goal when completely avoid-
ing a harmful act is impossible.
Method
We preregistered the design, sample size, and analysis 
plan for this study on AsPredicted (https://aspredicted 
.org/vp4rg.pdf). We aimed to recruit 200 participants 
from MTurk and collected a total of 203 participants. 
Following our preregistration plan, we removed 10 par-
ticipants who failed an attention check, resulting in a 
final sample of 193 participants (mean age = 40 years; 
67% female, 33% male).
Each participant was again randomly assigned to 
either an avoidable-harm condition or an unavoidable-
harm condition. As in the previous studies, participants 
in both conditions chose between two options—a 
harm-minimizing option or a benefit-maximizing 
option. In the avoidable-harm condition, the harm-
minimizing option involved using a type of harmless 
fertilizer that would enable the growth of additional 
crops sufficient to provide food to 1 million hungry 
children. In contrast, the benefit-maximizing option 
involved using an alternate fertilizer that would enable 
the growth of additional crops sufficient to provide 
food for 4 million hungry children but would cause a 
0.5-in. hole in the ozone layer. In the unavoidable-harm 
condition, participants were faced with the same trade-
off between whether or not a 0.5-in. hole in the ozone 
layer should be created to supply food for 3 million 
children, but this time, both options caused an addi-
tional 1-in. hole in the ozone layer. Specifically, the 
harm-minimizing option enabled the growth of enough 
food for 1 million children at the cost of creating a 1-in. 
hole in the ozone, whereas the benefit-maximizing 
option enabled the growth of enough food for 4 million 
children at the cost of creating a 1.5-in. hole in the 
ozone. In sum, across both conditions, participants 
faced the decision of whether a 0.5-in. hole in the 
ozone layer should be created to provide food for 3 
million hungry children.
After making their decision, participants completed 
two additional measures to examine the reason under-
lying their decision. The first question captured the 
impact of a harm-minimization motive on participants’ 
decisions by asking them to indicate the extent to 
which their decision was driven by a desire to do as 
little harm as possible to the ozone layer. The second 
question captured the impact of a benefit-maximization 
motive on participants’ decisions by asking them to 
indicate the extent to which their decision was driven 
by a desire to ensure that any harm to the ozone layer 
provided sufficient benefit. Participants indicated their 
responses to these two measures on separate 7-point 
scales (1 = not at all, 7 = very much).
Results
Consistent with our preregistered hypothesis, results 
showed that participants were less likely to commit 
greater harm in exchange for greater benefits in the 
avoidable-harm condition (21.6%) than in the unavoid-
able-harm condition (61.5%), χ2(1, N = 193) = 31.91, p < 
.001, ϕ = .41.
In accordance with our preregistered analysis plan, 
we computed a difference score by subtracting partici-
pants’ responses to the benefit-maximization measure 
from their responses to the harm-reduction measure to 
Moral Choice When Harming Is Unavoidable 5
examine the relative impact of these two goals on par-
ticipants’ decisions. Thus, a positive difference score 
reflected a greater reliance on a harm-reduction goal 
as opposed to a benefit-maximization goal. As pre-
dicted, analysis of this difference score indicated that 
the harm-reduction objective more strongly guided 
decision-making than the benefit-maximization objec-
tive in the avoidable-harm condition (M = 1.60, SD = 
3.32) than in the unavoidable-harm condition (M = 
−1.13, SD = 2.94), t(192) = 6.03, p < .001, d = 0.87, 95% 
CI = [0.57, 1.16].
Also as expected, a bootstrap mediation analysis 
with 10,000 samples (in which condition was entered 
as the independent variable, harm decisions were 
entered as the dependent variable, and the difference 
score was entered as the mediator) revealed a signifi-
cant indirect effect (95% CI = [0.19, 0.36]). The harm-
reduction goal more strongly guided decision-making 
than the benefit-maximization goal in the avoidable-
harm condition than in the unavoidable-harm condition 
(path a: b = 2.75, SE = 0.46, p < .001), and the more 
strongly the harm-reduction goal (relative to the ben-
efit-maximization goal) guided decision-making, the 
more likely participants were to minimize harm (path 
b: b = 0.10, SE = 0.01, p < .001). When the mediator was 
controlled for, the effect of condition on harm decisions 
was significantly reduced (path c: b = 0.40, SE = 0.07, 
p < .001; path c′: b = 0.13, SE = 0.05, p = .013).
Study 4: Increasing Versus 
Diminishing Marginal Returns to Harm
In Study 4, we examined the robustness of our findings. 
In our previous studies, the options in the unavoidable-
harm conditions furnished increasing marginal returns 
to committing greater harm (e.g., pulling life support 
from a second child provided a greater marginal 
increase in money saved than pulling life support from 
the first). It is therefore possible that individuals are 
willing to exchange greater harm for greater benefit 
only when doing so produces efficiency gains (cf. de 
Langhe & Puntoni, 2014). If so, we would expect par-
ticipants to be particularly averse to committing greater 
harm when it furnishes diminishing marginal returns 
(e.g., pulling life support from a second child provides 
a smaller marginal increase in money saved than pulling 
life support from the first). However, we propose that 
the desire to completely avoid committing a harmful 
act holds a particularly strong influence on choice. 
Thus, we predicted that decision-makers would be 
more likely to minimize harm when it was possible to 
avoid committing any harm relative to when choice sets 
offered diminishing marginal returns to committing 
greater harm.
Method
We preregistered the design, sample size, and analysis 
plan for this study on AsPredicted (https://aspredicted 
.org/3kq9y.pdf). We aimed to recruit 500 participants 
from MTurk and obtained a total sample of 509 partici-
pants. Following our preregistration plan, we removed 
28 participants who failed an attention check, resulting 
in a final sample of 481 participants (mean age = 37 
years; 55% female, 45% male).
All participants read an adapted version of the classic 
trolley problem (Foot, 1967; Thomson, 1976). In this 
version, a trolley without passengers and without a 
conductor was traveling at full speed down a track 
toward 11 people who would all die if nothing changed. 
In the avoidable-harm condition, participants faced a 
decision about whether to push an individual onto the 
tracks, a decision that would kill this individual but 
would slow the trolley enough to save three people. 
Whereas choosing to push the person would maximize 
benefits, it also would require committing a harmful 
act.
In the diminishing-marginal-returns-to-harm condi-
tion, participants faced a decision about whether to 
push one individual onto the tracks in order to slow 
the trolley enough to save three people or to push two 
individuals onto the tracks in order to slow the trolley 
enough to save five people. Thus, both options required 
committing harmful acts. Moreover, the marginal ben-
efits achieved from pushing a second person (two lives 
saved) were smaller than the benefits achieved from 
pushing the first person onto the tracks (three lives 
saved).
Finally, in the increasing-marginal-returns-to-harm 
condition, participants faced a decision about whether 
to push one individual onto the tracks in order to slow 
the trolley enough to save two people or to push two 
individuals onto the tracks in order to slow the trolley 
enough to save five people. Again, both options 
required committing harmful acts. Moreover, the mar-
ginal benefits achieved from pushing a second person 
(three lives saved) were larger than the benefits 
achieved from pushing the first person onto the tracks 
(two lives saved).
The decision that participants faced in the present 
study equated harms and benefits on the same scale (lives 
sacrificed vs. lives saved) and therefore allowed for a 
clear way to calculate the expected value of outcomes. 
In particular, in all conditions, the benefit-maximizing 
option led to a larger number of net lives saved than the 
harm-minimizing option. Thus, if actors become more 
consequentialist when the option to completely avoid 
committing any harm is removed, then they would be 
more likely to choose the benefit-maximization option 
(i.e., the option that maximizes social welfare) in both 
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the increasing-marginal-returns-to-harm and diminishing-
marginal-returns-to-harm conditions than in the avoid-
able-harm condition.
Results
Consistent with our preregistered hypothesis, partici-
pants were less likely to commit greater harm for 
greater benefits in the avoidable-harm condition (25.5%) 
than in both the diminishing-marginal-returns-to-harm 
condition (38.6%), χ2(1, N = 319) = 6.33, p = .01, ϕ = 
.14, and the increasing-marginal-returns-to-harm condi-
tion (59.3%), χ2(1, N = 364) = 37.75, p < .001, ϕ = .34. 
Additionally, participants were less likely to commit 
greater harm for greater benefits in the diminishing-
marginal-returns-to-harm condition than in the increas-
ing-marginal-returns-to-harm condition, χ2(1, N = 320) = 
13.65, p < .001, ϕ = .21.
Discussion
Although participants were more likely to commit more 
harm when it furnished increasing marginal returns, a 
preference for increasing marginal returns to harm can-
not fully explain our findings. Moreover, it appears that 
actors become more consequentialist when committing 
harm is unavoidable.2
Study 4 further shows that it is the unavoidability of 
harmful acts—not the unavoidability of harmful out-
comes—that increases willingness to exchange greater 
harms for greater benefits. Across all conditions, a 
harmful outcome was unavoidable—at least one person 
would die regardless of what was chosen. However, it 
was only when participants could altogether escape 
committing a harmful act (in the avoidable-harm condi-
tion) that they were particularly resistant to trading off 
greater harm for greater benefits.
Study 5: Protected Values Become 
Corrupted When Committing Harm Is 
Unavoidable
Protected values are those that people consider infi-
nitely important and ought not be traded off under any 
circumstance (Baron & Spranca, 1997; Tetlock, Kristel, 
Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000). In Study 5, we examined 
whether people who believe that harming violates a 
protected value would be particularly reluctant to 
exchange greater harm for greater benefits even when 
some harm must be committed.
On the one hand, proclaiming that a harm violates 
an infinitely important protected value may cause indi-
viduals to minimize that harm irrespective of the deci-
sion context. On the other hand, some individuals are 
willing to put a price on protected values when pressed 
(Baron & Leshner, 2000). Protected values may thus 
better reflect a resistance to engage in a negotiation 
over a value rather than an absolute resistance to mak-
ing value trade-offs per se. These individuals may fur-
ther find it particularly tragic to commit harm without 
sufficient benefit.
We expected that people are particularly averse to 
making value trade-offs that violate a protected value 
when it is possible to avoid committing any violation 
of it. However, we also expected that when individuals 
must commit some harm that violates a protected value, 
they will become more willing to exchange greater 
harm for greater benefit. In contrast, we expected that 
people who do not believe that a value is sacred—and 
thus do not object to making value trade-offs—would 
display greater preference consistency across both 
types of dilemmas.
Method
We preregistered the design, sample size, and analysis 
plan for this study on AsPredicted (https://aspredicted 
.org/rz98j.pdf). We aimed to recruit 400 participants 
from MTurk and collected a total of 410 participants. 
Following our preregistration plan, we removed 14 par-
ticipants who failed an attention check, resulting in a 
final sample of 396 participants (mean age = 37 years; 
49% female, 51% male).
All participants first indicated whether they per-
ceived preserving tropical rain-forest trees to be a pro-
tected value. In particular, participants indicated which 
one of three options best matched their reaction to 
cutting down tropical rain-forest trees: “This is accept-
able if it leads to some sort of benefits (money or 
something else) that are great enough,” “This is not 
acceptable no matter how great the benefits,” and “I do 
not object to this.” Participants selected the button next 
to their preferred response. Following prior literature 
(Ritov & Baron, 1999), we coded only participants who 
selected the second response (76.2% of participants) 
as perceiving this harm as a violation of a protected 
value.
Next, all participants faced two decisions that imper-
iled the preservation of a tropical rain forest. Specifi-
cally, in the avoidable-harm condition, participants 
chose between two proposals: One proposed to build 
one water-treatment facility and would not require the 
destruction of any tropical rain-forest trees (i.e., the 
harm-minimizing option), and the other proposed to 
build five water-treatment facilities but required the 
destruction of one acre of tropical rain-forest trees (i.e., 
the benefit-maximizing option). In the unavoidable-
harm condition, participants chose between a proposal 
to build one water-treatment facility that required the 
destruction of one acre of tropical rain-forest trees (i.e., 
Moral Choice When Harming Is Unavoidable 7
the harm-minimizing option) and another proposal to 
build five water-treatment facilities that required the 
destruction of two acres of tropical rain-forest trees 
(i.e., the benefit-maximizing option). In sum, across 
both dilemmas, participants faced the decision of 
whether one acre of rain forest should be razed to 
enable the creation of four additional water-treatment 
facilities.
Participants viewed both dilemmas in a counterbal-
anced order. Thus, this study employed a 2 (protected 
value: yes, no) × 2 (dilemma: avoidable harm, unavoid-
able harm) mixed factorial design in which protected 
values constituted a measured between-participants 
factor and dilemma constituted a manipulated within-
participants factor.
Results
We conducted a binary logistic mixed-effects regression 
that included random intercepts to control for within-
participants variability and that regressed the decision 
context, self-reported protected values, and the interac-
tion of these terms on participants’ decisions. This 
regression revealed a significant interaction (b = 1.20, 
SE = 0.51, z = 2.34, p = .019), consistent with our pre-
registered hypothesis (see Fig. 1). Planned contrasts 
revealed that participants who perceived that the 
destruction of the rain forest violated a protected value 
were more likely to decide that one acre of this rain 
forest should be destroyed to enable the creation of 
four additional water-treatment facilities in the unavoid-
able-harm scenario (67.1%) than in the avoidable-harm 
scenario (42.0%; b = 1.71, SE = 0.25, z = 6.77, p < .001). 
By contrast, participants who did not perceive that the 
destruction of the rain forest violated a protected value 
were equally likely to decide that one acre of rain forest 
should be razed to enable the creation of four addi-
tional water-treatment facilities in both the unavoid-
able-harm scenario (74.0%) and the avoidable-harm 
scenario (68.4%; b = 0.51, SE = 0.43, z = 1.22, p = .22).
Participants who indicated that rain-forest preserva-
tion is sacred sought to minimize rain-forest destruction 
when it was possible to avoid committing any rain-
forest destruction. However, when this was not possi-
ble, these individuals became much more willing to 
commit greater destruction to maximize benefits. 
Whereas past researchers have argued that individuals 
holding protected values are scope insensitive (Ritov 
& Baron, 1999), we found that this is not the case when 
the commission of harm is unavoidable.3
General Discussion
Across six studies, we demonstrated that the preference 
to avoid inflicting any harm not only is distinct from 
but also outweighs the preference to minimize its 
impact. Our results suggest that the manner in which 
individuals bracket instances of harm affects their 
willingness to commit harm (cf. Read, Loewenstein, 
Rabin, Keren, & Laibson, 1999). For instance, individu-
als may be more reluctant to commit a second viola-
tion a month after a first violation than they would 
be if the second violation occurred just moments after 
the first. This is because the two harmful actions may 
be more likely to be bracketed together in the latter 
case and may thus be perceived as an unavoidable-
harm context.
Although we focused our examination on decisions 
impacting social welfare, similar outcomes may occur 
for decisions that are exclusively self-relevant. For 
instance, research suggests that individuals are particu-
larly averse to holding debt if they do not need to be 
in debt but prefer to take on more debt to maintain 
their assets if holding debt is unavoidable (Sussman & 
Shafir, 2012).
Finally, in Study 4, we found that even when greater 
harm produced diminishing marginal benefits, individu-
als were still more willing to commit greater harm than 
when it was possible to commit no harm. However, there 
is likely a threshold for which committing more harm is 
no longer perceived as worthwhile. Future research can 
investigate factors that affect this threshold.
In sum, we found that decision-makers who can 
completely avoid committing a harmful act frequently 
choose to do so. However, when committing some 
harm is unavoidable, decision-makers become increas-
ingly willing to trade off greater harm for greater 
benefits.
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Fig. 1. Results from Study 5: percentage of participants who chose 
to commit greater harm in exchange for greater benefits by whether 
or not the participant indicated that rain-forest preservation is a 
protected value and type of ethical dilemma. Error bars correspond 
to 95% confidence intervals.
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Notes
1. Study S1 (reported at https://osf.io/4vd53/) ruled out the pos-
sibility that participants were averse to harming a single child in 
the avoidable-harm condition because of the identifiable-victim 
effect (Kogut & Ritov, 2011).
2. For conceptual replications of Study 4, see Studies S2 and S3 
at https://osf.io/4vd53/.
3. The within-participants design of Study 5 additionally ruled 
out a value-uncertainty explanation for our findings (see Study 
S4 at https://osf.io/4vd53/).
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